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1See Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999) and Woodford (2000) for summaries.  A growing
literature assesses how improved stabilisation may be achieved under discretion (when
intertemporal commitment is generally infeasible) by altering the loss function to be minimised
under delegation by an independent central bank.  These include interest rate smoothing
(Woodford, 1999), nominal income growth targeting (Jensen, 1999; Rudebusch, 2000) and
targeting the change in the output gap (Soderstrom, 2001; Walsh, 2001).
1
Introduction
The monetary policy literature has made rapid progress in recent years in analysing the
consequences for optimal policy of the presence of forward looking inflation expectations in the
Phillips curve or aggregate supply relationship.  When commitment is feasible optimal policy in
response to a supply shock adjusts future policy to improve current outcomes through the
intertemporal link of expected future inflation in the Phillips curve.
1  From the point of view of
the future taken in isolation such a policy is costly (and hence is not generally carried out under
discretion, resulting in stabilisation bias) but optimal policy balances these future costs against
current benefits.  Clearly the strength of the intertemporal link in the Phillips curve, primarily the
size of the coefficient on expected future inflation, is important for optimal policy as well as
more generally for our understanding of macroeconomic dynamics.
This paper analyses the microfoundations of the Phillips curve and the coefficient on expected
future inflation in particular, showing that the standard value of close to unity used in the
literature from Calvo pricing is not robust to plausible and relatively minor changes in its
microfoundations.  The paper presents a generalised version of the Phillips curves used in the
literature that may provide a better basis for policy analysis and shows its implications for
optimal policy.  The common theme is fully optimising microfoundations but with different
exogenous staggering structures, motivated in part by concerns about the robustness of the Calvo     
2For example see Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999), Svensson (1999), McCallum and Nelson
(1999a, b) and Rotemberg and Woodford (1999).
2
Bt ’ $Et[Bt%1] % 6xt % ut (1)
model (see Wolman, 1999; Dotsey, King and Wolman, 1999, for recent discussion and results)
and more generally by the empirical evidence presented in Taylor (1999) who emphasises the
observed richness and variety of price and/or wage staggering structures and our comparative
ignorance of how to model them most accurately.  McCallum (199 ) suggests that aggregate
supply is the least well understood component of monetary policy models.
It is helpful to briefly review the use of the New Keynesian Phillips curve in the monetary policy
literature before setting out the contribution of the current paper in more detail.  The Calvo
(1983) model, which gives rise to a New Keynesian Phillips curve of the form shown by (1), has
become the workhorse for much recent research.
2  In (1) B is the rate of inflation, $ the (real)
discount factor which is close to unity, x the driving variable (such as the output gap or marginal
cost), 6 a constant and u a shock variable.
Price staggering in the Calvo model is introduced by firms only being able to reset their prices
at stochastic times and a simplifying assumption is made that the probability of being able to
reset price in a given period is constant and unrelated to the time that has elapsed since the last
price change.  Clearly this is a strong assumption but use of the model has been encouraged by
broad similarities between its properties and those of other models of price staggering.  For
example Rotemberg's (1987) model of convex price adjustment costs also leads to a Phillips
curve of the Calvo form, though Rotemberg regards convex price adjustment costs as a
simplifying rather than fundamental assumption in much the same way as Calvo (1983) presents     
3 The Taylor Phillips curve is sometimes presented (see Roberts, 1995, and Walsh, 1998, eqn.
(5.45) p.217 for example) in the form of (1) but with an additional 'expectational error' term on
the right hand side involving Et-1[Bt]-Bt (which is zero under perfect foresight but not otherwise).
This 'error' is sometimes combined with the shock term, ut, to form a composite error.  This is
algebraically correct but it is misleading if this error is subsequently treated as exogenous.  On
average under rational expectations the expectational error should be zero but its size in any
given time period, and thus its effect on the Phillips curve, is endogenous to time t policy because
Et-1[Bt] is pre-determined at t whereas Bt is not.  Hence treating the error as if it is zero or
exogenous overstates the true coefficient on Et[Bt+1] in the Phillips curve.
     
4The driving variable and shock terms also take a more complex form in the Taylor model.
These are explored thoroughly below but for now the focus is on the terms in expected inflation
and hence we use the general form f(x,u) in (2).  Kiley (1998) draws attention to the general
differences between the Calvo and Taylor models but without explicit reference to the different
coefficients on expected inflation in (1) and (2) and their implications for optimal policy.
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the constant probability of price change assumption.
A number of authors (for example Roberts, 1995, and Walsh, 1998) have also pointed to broad
similarities between the Calvo model and that of Taylor (1979, 1980) where price changes are
also staggered but are simply fixed for two (or more) periods at a time.  If it was the case that
both the Calvo and Taylor models, with their different staggering assumptions, predicted the
same form for the Phillips curve it would be strong evidence that the details of staggering
structures are not very important but we show that this is not the case, particularly in the presence
of supply shocks which present the most acute problems for policy makers.  Under perfect
foresight the Taylor model is similar to the Calvo case (1), and has an identical coefficient on
expected future inflation.  If shocks are present, however, Taylor staggering gives the Phillips
curve (2) in which Et-1[Bt] is present and the coefficient on Et[Bt+1] is approximately half its value
in (1).
3,4 This has very different implications for optimal policy compared with (1) given the
discussion above about the role of this coefficient in influencing the optimal extent to which





Et[Bt%1] % f(x,u) (2)
Given that the Calvo and Taylor Phillips curves differ significantly in the presence of supply
shocks it appears that we are in the uncomfortable position of having divergent predictions for
the Phillips curve from different assumptions about price staggering when there seems little
compelling reason to find one or other more plausible.  In terms of these models it also appears
to be a binary choice with strong implications for the policy conclusions that will follow.  Given
this choice a common stance is to choose the Calvo Phillips curve (1), primarily because the
Calvo model has more explicit microfoundations than the standard derivation of the Taylor
model (see Clarida, Gali and Gertler, 1999, and the discussion in Walsh, 1998, for examples).
We show below, however, that the latter may be derived from exactly the same microfoundations
as Calvo, the difference between the two arising solely from different exogenous staggering
constraints faced by optimising agents.
The main contribution of this paper is to show that the Calvo and Taylor models may both be
viewed as special cases of a more general model that we derive below.  This clarifies the reason
for their different predictions for the Phillips curve, which arise solely from their different
assumptions about price change staggering, and clarifies that their underlying microfoundations
are the same apart from the staggering structure.  The generalised model follows the Calvo
approach of making firms' ability to change price stochastic, but rather than the probability of
being able to change price remaining constant we allow it to take a different value one period
after a price change (q1) than the per period probability thereafter (q).  This simple generalisation     
5Wolman (1999) considers a richer structure of probabilities though without explicit results
for the Phillips curve or optimal policy.
     
6Mankiw and Reiss (2001) derive a Phillips curve from a different approach in which the term






Et[Bt%1] % g(x,u) (3)
(which by no means exhausts all possibilities
5) encompasses the Calvo model for which q1=q and
the Taylor model where q1=0 and q=1 (for two period fixed prices).  Defining q*=q-q1, where q*
is zero in Calvo and unity in Taylor, allows the generalised Calvo-Taylor Phillips curve (derived
in full below) to be expressed by (3) where for the time being we focus on the terms in expected
inflation and leave the driving variable and shock terms in general form.
From (3) it is clear that the generalised model has coefficients on Et-1[Bt] and Et[Bt+1] that vary
with q* (0#q*#1) between those in (2) and (1) above of approximately a half each and zero for
the former and close to unity for the latter.  Thus the generalised model clarifies the similarities
and differences between the Calvo and Taylor models individually while suggesting that it is not
appropriate, given our limited understanding of the most realistic way to model price staggering
(and pending further empirical evidence), to choose one or the other.  Instead it appears that good
practice requires monetary policy analysis to check the sensitivity of results to variation in the
expected inflation coefficients in the Phillips curve at least between the ranges suggested above.
6
To explore the implications of different staggering structures for the Phillips curve further we
also derive a version of the generalised model in which wages rather than prices are staggered,
the latter being fully flexible ex post in this case.  We show that this reversal of the roles of the
two key nominal variables makes no difference to the coefficients on the first two terms in (3).     
7The approach to this issue of Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2001), Sbordone (2001)
and Woodford (2001), who introduce price or wage indexing, appears very promising but it
appears to be too early to regard these models as widely accepted.  If optimising
microfoundations for inflation persistence emerge from time dependent staggering the
generalised model of this paper (which could be extended to include indexing behaviour) will
also contribute to this research program.
6
This is a standard result with Taylor staggering but less familiar with Calvo probabilities and new
for the generalised model.  We also show the consequences, for the staggered prices version of
the generalised model, of wages being partly set in advance rather than being flexible ex post.
This is in the spirit of the models of Barro and Gordon (1983) and Rogoff (1985) except that ex
ante wage setting coexists with price staggering.  In this case the coefficient on Et-1[Bt] increases
relative to that in (3) and that on Et[Bt+1] falls further.
We also note two aspects of the literature which we do not address in the paper.  The first is that
it has become increasingly common to introduce some inflation persistence (through a term in
Bt-1) into the Phillips curve.  This is motivated primarily by the strong empirical evidence for
persistence in the inflation process (see Rudebusch, 2000, and Roberts, 2001 for excellent
summaries and fresh empirical results) but as yet there is no consensus on optimising
microfoundations for this.
7  The focus of this paper is the different forms of the Phillips curve
that emerge from different staggering structures with common optimising microfoundations.
Hence we do not consider inflation persistence directly while noting that, i) the generalised
Calvo-Taylor model does not have any structural inflation persistence in the sense that Bt-1 does
not appear in the Phillips curve (except when wages are set partly ex ante and then as part of a
time t-1 expectation error which may be considered exogenous to time t policy choices), but ii)
under discretion inflation has some serial correlation in univariate reduced form.  The latter is     
8The criticism in footnote 1 of some interpretations of the Taylor model extends to the usual
presentation of the Fuhrer-Moore (1995) relative real wage contracting model also.  This model
is often used as the basis for introducing inflation persistence.  With a discount factor of unity
for simplicity and considering only terms in inflation, the Fuhrer-Moore Phillips curve is usually
reported (for example see Walsh, 1998, eqn. (5.62) p. 225) as Bt=½(Bt-1+Et[Bt+1]]+0t/2 where
0=Et-1[Bt]-Bt.  The expectational error 0t is sometimes taken as exogenous or zero or rolled into
a composite error term with the truly exogenous shock variable (see for example the definition
of ,5t in eqn. (8) of Batini and Haldane, 1999).  As in footnote 1, Et-1[Bt] is pre-determined at time
t whereas Bt is not and hence their difference should not be treated as exogenous at time t (except
under perfect foresight which is not usually the case of interest).  Making 0t explicit gives the
inflation terms in the Fuhrer-Moore Phillips curve when shocks are present by Bt=(1/3)(Bt-1+Et-
1[Bt]+Et[Bt+1]).
     
9Bhaskar (1999) summarises arguments questioning these results while providing an
additional mechanism to support them.
7
not the case in the Calvo model but may contribute to observed inflation persistence in practice.
8
The second restriction of scope is that we consider only time dependent pricing behaviour.  While
Ball and Ceccheti (1988) and Ball and Romer (1989) showed that staggering may emerge as an
equilibrium
9 it might be argued that state dependent pricing models are more theoretically
attractive.  While sympathetic to this view, the stance taken in this paper is that the implications
of state dependent pricing for the Phillips curve are not fully understood and hence pending
further progress (see Dotsey, King and Wolman, 1999, for a recent contribution), and given the
use of time dependent pricing in most of the monetary policy literature, it remains important for
us to understand the robustness of the workhorse Calvo model and the impact of different time
dependent staggering structures more generally.
While the prime contribution of the paper is the derivation of the generalised Calvo-Taylor
Phillips curve model we also derive optimal policy for the model in the presence of supply
shocks.  This confirms the link between the coefficient on Et[Bt+1] in the Phillips curve and  the     
10See also Dittmar and Gavin (2000) and Goodfriend and King (2001).
     
11An assessment of the various mechanisms that have been proposed to achieve appropriate
'policy inertia' (see footnote 1) in the new generalised model is beyond the scope of this paper but
it seems highly likely that the reduced coefficient on expected future inflation in the Phillips
curve reduces the optimal degree of inertia (though not to zero).
8
extent to which policy should alter its future course in order to affect current outcomes.  In
particular we examine the result of Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999) who showed that with a
simple Calvo Phillips curve and a standard policy loss function involving fluctuations in the
output gap and inflation about target, optimal policy involves a stationary price level.
10  If an
inflation increasing shock occurs at time t, optimal policy commits to inflation below its (zero)
target next period in order to influence the value of Et[Bt+1] and thus the time t inflation-output
tradeoff.  The combined effect of these inflation rates, together with the optimal subsequent
return to zero inflation, is that the sum of the inflation rates (which corresponds to the cumulative
change in the price level) from the time of the shock into the infinite future is zero (except in so
far as further shocks in the future may peturb that path).  Hence based on the assumption of a
Calvo Phillips curve, optimal monetary policy with inflation rates in the loss function implies
price level targeting type policy choices.  We show that this result no longer holds in the
generalised Calvo-Taylor model and while it remains optimal to have a lower inflation rate than
otherwise the period after an inflation increasing supply shock the optimal path no longer fully
offsets the initial impact of the shock on the price level.
11
This result complements the same finding by Jensen (1999) when inflation is persistent (which
is also implicit in Steinsson, 2000) but shows that the optimality of price level targeting is not
robust even without inflation persistence.  Given the continued controversy about the degree of
inflation persistence this result suggests very strongly that a cautious approach is required before9
advocating price level targeting (see King, 1999) and is also highly relevant for the ongoing
debate about the appropriate objectives for the European Central Bank discussed by Alesina et.
al. (2001) amongst others.  More generally the policy results are supportive of the mixed
inflation-price level targeting approach of Nessen and Vestin (2000) and Batini and Yates (2001).
The paper is structured very simply in that Section 1 derives the generalised Phillips curve model
when either prices or wages are staggered (but with the other flexible), Section 2 analyses the
case of staggered prices with wages partly set ex ante, and Section 3 shows the implications of
the analysis for optimal policy and inflation vs. price level targeting in particular.  Section 4
concludes while the appendices contain supplementary material, including detailed
microfoundations for optimal price and wage setting behaviour to emphasise that the Phillips
curve models derived share common optimising microfoundations, their differences arising from
different staggering constraints.
1. The Generalised Calvo-Taylor Model
This section derives the generalised Calvo-Taylor model, initially for the case where prices are
staggered but wages are fully flexible, before showing that similar results obtain if these roles are
reversed.  We consider the price setting decision of a firm that is able to change its price at time
t subject to the exogenous probabilities of being able to change price again in the future of q1 the
following period and q each period thereafter assuming that the price has not already been
changed again.  As noted above the special case of q1=q recovers the Calvo model and q1=0, q=1
corresponds to the Taylor model.  Having derived and simplified the optimal price for a single
firm we substitute for these individual prices into the appropriate expression for inflation given     
12We also follow Rotemberg (1987) and the standard forms of the Calvo and Taylor models
in assuming that new prices in a given time period are set ex post on the basis of information
available in that time period.  This contrasts with the original papers by Fischer (1977) and
Taylor (1979) where new prices or wages were set the previous period.  Rotemberg and
Woodford (1997) allow for some agents (in an otherwise Calvo framework) to have to set prices
on the basis of previous period information.  This reduces the importance of time t dated
expectations in the Phillips curve and thus the potential gains from intertemporal commitment.
In Section 2 we allow for a proportion of wages to be set ex ante while new prices remain set ex
post which has a similar effect.
10
this staggering structure (derived in Appendix B) to generate the Phillips curve for this model.
Appendix A gives microfoundations for optimal single period behaviour upon which the multi-
period optimisation under staggering constraints is based.
We follow the standard discrete time solution procedure for the Calvo model (as in Rotemberg,
1987 and summarised in Walsh, 1998, p.218-220) subject to the different probability structure
noted above.
12  Based on a second order Taylor series for profits as a function of price this
approximates the firm's optimisation by the minimisation of the expected discounted and
probability weighted sum of a per period loss function that is quadratic in the difference between
the logs of the firm's price and the ideal single period price.  The latter is derived in Appendix
A, denoted p* and corresponds to the price which the firm would set in that period in the absence
of constraints on changing prices in the future.  This term for each period is discounted by the
(real) per period discount factor, $, and weighted by the probability of the price set at time t still
being in place in each subsequent period, t+j.  This probability is simply (1-q1)(1-q)
j-1 for j$1 and
unity for j=0.  The optimisation need not consider what happens after the firm has been able to
reset its price since the choice of price at time t does not constrain that subsequent optimisation.
Hence the firms choice problem may be expressed by (4) where L
f is the total loss function for
firm i and xit the price it sets at t.11
Minxit L
f
i ’ Et [ (xit&pt()2 % E
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xt ’ $(1&q)Et[xt%1] % 1&$(1&q)
1%$q(
[pt(%$q(Et[pt%1(]] (9)
The first order condition for (4) is given by (5) which shows that the optimal price set by a firm
at time t depends on the current and expected future optimal single period prices, appropriately
weighted by the discount factor and the probability of the time t price still being in effect in future
periods.  For convenience we use the notation q*=q-q1 which is zero in the Calvo model and
unity in the Taylor model while unrestricted here.
From this point we may drop the i subscript due to symmetry across firms that are changing their
prices at the same time.  It is convenient to take the period t+1 out of the last term in (5) to give
(6).
Next we shift (5) one period ahead to give the optimal xt+1 and take expectations of this at t to
give (7).
In turn (7) may be rearranged to give (8), the right hand side of which is the same as the last term






























In turn we may substitute for Et[xt+1] in terms of Et[Bt+1] from (B7) and p*=p+(y+, from (A11),
where y is the (log) output gap and , a shock term, to give (10) where k is defined by (11).
In turn we may lag (10) one period to give the optimal price set at t-1 by (12).
At this point we draw on the material in Appendix B which derives the rate of inflation given the
staggering structure and the prices set at different times; xt, xt-1 etc.  In particular (B6) may be
rearranged to give (13) in which it may be seen that the two pairs of terms correspond to the left
hand side minus the first term on the right hand side of (10) and (12).  From (13) we can see that
the origin of the Calvo special case is that with q*=0 the second pair of terms in (13) disappear
so the prices set at t-1 become immaterial and Et-1[Bt], which appears in (12) but not (10), will
be absent from the Phillips curve.









Calvo-Taylor model and the key result of this section.
From (14) it may be seen that the absolute values of q1 and q matter only for the parameter k
given in (11) whereas q* plays a more significant role.  Firstly if q*=0, the Calvo case, the whole
of the second line and the last two terms of the first line disappear and (14) takes the same form
as (1).  If q* is positive the coefficient on Et[Bt+1] is reduced, that on Et-1[Bt] becomes larger, and
the output gap and shock terms have a richer structure involving both lags and expectations over
these variables which are not present in the Calvo model.  It may be noted that the response of
inflation in (14) to inflation expectations, output gaps and shocks has unusual properties if q* is
negative but this would only arise if the probability of being able to change price decreases rather
than increases with the time elapsed since the last price change.  This seems implausible and we
restrict attention to 0#q*$1.
Focusing on the role of inflation expectations in (14), Figure 1 shows the coefficients on Et[Bt+1]
and Et-1[Bt] as functions of q* (by lines AA and BB respectively) with q*=0 corresponding to the
Calvo model and q*=1 the Taylor model as before.  The figure confirms the discussion in the
introduction in that these models may be regarded as special cases of the more general model
presented above with the expected inflation coefficients varying monotonically (with mild non-
linearity) with q* between the two.  There are no discontinuous jumps but it is clear that the
particular coefficients of the Calvo and Taylor models are not robust to changes in the structure
of probabilities of price changes.  In a policy context, as we show in the following section, the14
decline in the coefficient on Et[Bt+1] with q* is especially significant because of its impact on the
extent to which committing to future policy actions can improve the current tradeoff between
inflation and the output gap.  In the generalised model this coefficient varies between $.1 if q*=0
and $/(1+$).1/2 if q*=1 while the coefficient on Et-1[Bt] varies between zero and approximately
a half.
From (14) we note that q*>0, in addition to reducing the coefficient on Et[Bt+1], introduces the
term in Et[yt+1] which is a further intertemporal link in the Phillips curve though it does not offset
the former effect in the policy results.  More generally q*>0 gives rise to a richer structure for
the effects of lagged and expected future output and shocks.  In addition we note that (14)
suggests that the model may give rise to observed inflation persistence (even though there is no
structural persistence in the sense that lagged inflation does not appear in the Phillips curve) since
the second line of (14) is equal to q* times the first line of the equivalent expression for Bt-1.
Hence, contingent on policy choices, inflation in each period may be positively correlated with
inflation in the previous and following periods.  This is confirmed by the policy results of Section
3.
We also note that the generalised model shares the property of the Calvo and Taylor models
individually of violating the weak form of the natural rate hypothesis in the sense that the sum
of the coefficients on inflation terms on the right hand side of (14), which equals
$(1+q*)/(1+$q*), is less than one unless $=1 though Figure 1 shows that the difference is small
at least for plausible values of $ close to unity (0.98 in the figure).  Hence the average output gap
is a function of average inflation though the relationship is very weak.  Under perfect foresight
(14) becomes (15) where the sum of inflation coefficients on the right hand side is simply $.15
Bt ’ $Et[Bt%1] % (1%$q()k([q(yt&1%(1%$q(2)yt%$q(yt%1] (15)
From (15) we note that under perfect foresight the generalised model reduces to the Calvo form
(1) with respect to the expected inflation coefficients though the richer structure of output gaps
remains.  As noted above the perfect foresight Phillips curve is not applicable when analysing
optimal policy responses to shocks.
Lastly, while we derived the generalised model assuming that prices are staggered with wages
set flexibly ex post these roles may be reversed and the terms in expected inflation are the same
as in (14).  This is shown in Appendix C which uses exactly the same microfoundations as the
model above while changing the staggering assumptions.  Typically the Calvo model has been
used only in a staggered prices-flexible wages context while the Taylor model has been used with
either prices or wages staggered.  Hence one may think of either of these models (defined by their
assumptions about the probability of changing the staggered variable), or their generalisation
above, being combined with staggered prices or staggered wages.
2. Generalised Calvo-Taylor Model: Staggered prices with wages partly set ex ante.
The generalised Calvo-Taylor model of the previous section assumed that either prices or wages
were staggered, according to the (q1,q) probability structure, whereas the other variable was set
with full flexibility ex post.  This naturally raises the question of what happens if there is some
form of staggering or timing constraints on the setting of both variables.  Clearly there are many
possibilities including changes in both variables being stochastic (possibly with different
probabilities) or one could be stochastic and the other set for fixed periods of time, and with each16
of these the variables could wholly or partly have to be set in advance rather than ex post.
Exploring all of these is beyond the scope of the paper and we focus on a particular case where
prices are set as in the previous section while wages are still set for a single period but with a
constraint that they must be partly set in advance.  We show that even with this relatively simple
modification there are significant changes in the Phillips curve and optimal policy.  More
precisely we assume that a fraction, µ, of wages must be set in advance or on the basis of
previous period information while the remaining fraction, 1-µ, are set as before.  As noted above,
Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) make a similar assumption with respect to price setters and the
approach is also in the spirit of the original Fischer (1977) and Taylor (1979) staggering papers
where wages were set ex ante as well as Barro and Gordon (1983) and Rogoff (1985) where
wages are set entirely in advance.  The staggering/timing assumptions of this section are also of
interest because in the limit where q1 tends to unity (so prices become flexible) and µ tends to
one (all wages are set in advance) the model become the same as that in Barro and Gordon (1983)
and Rogoff (1985) and the substantial literature that follows them.  That having been said we do
not place special emphasis on that special case and present this version of the generalised model
as i) potentially realistic to the extent that prices are staggered but wages are partly set in advance
of the period for which they will apply, and ii) more generally a further exploration of the
possible form of the Phillips curve given different timing and staggering constraints, once again
based on fully optimising microfoundations given those constraints.
From the above we assume that the aggregate or average nominal wage, W (in levels), is given
by (16) where W
p is the ex post wage given by (A11) as in the previous section, and W
a the ex     
13In common with much of the literature we ignore possible aggregation issues and treat W
in (16) as the common wage level in all firms.
     
14The shocks in the model are all log-linear and all variables are log-linear in those shocks and
hence arithmetic mean preserving spreads in logs and geometric mean preserving spreads in
levels.  Since the log of a geometric mean is the same as the arithmetic mean of a log we have


































pt( ’ pt%(yt%,t%µ[(1(Et&1[Bt]&Bt)%(2(Et&1[yt]&yt)] (19)
ante wage.
13
For the ex ante wage we follow the approach of Rogoff (1985) which amounts to workers setting
W
a in advance to satisfy the expected value (A11) which gives (17).
14
Using (A11), (16) and (17) the aggregate or average wage rate is given by (18) and substituting
this into the optimal single period price for firm i, Pi given by (A10) gives us the log optimal
single period price across all firms, p*, by (19) which may be compared with (A13) where the











































We now summarise the derivation of the Phillips curve for this version of the generalised model.
Firstly it may be noted that the new constraint on wage setting enters the derivation of Section
1 only through p* in (19) and hence (4)-(9) above remain unchanged since p* appears in general
form.  Substituting the new p* from (19) into (9) gives (21) as the equivalent of (10).
We lag (21) one period to generate the equivalent expression for xt-1 and substitute that and (21)
into (13) to give the Phillips curve for this model by (22).
We briefly note the properties of (22) compared with (14): i) (22) reduces to (14) if µ=0, which
simply follows from the definition of µ; ii) the perfect foresight version of (22) is the same as the
perfect foresight version of (14) given by (15), which follows by inspection of (19) given that
expectation errors are zero under perfect foresight (intuitively, perfect foresight implies that the19
distinction between setting a variable ex ante and ex post disappears); iii) more generally if wages
are partly set in advance (µ>0) the coefficient on Et[Bt+1] in the Phillips curve (22) is smaller than
in (14) and that on Et-1[Bt] is larger; iv) a special case of this is that if µ and q1 tend to unity (so
prices are flexible, which implies that k becomes large, and all wages are set ex ante) the
coefficient on Et[Bt+1] tends to zero and that on Et-1[Bt] tends to unity (thus giving a "Barro-
Gordon-Rogoff" form to inflation expectations in the Phillips curve); v) the ex ante setting of
some wages results in the expectation error terms in the second, third and fourth lines of (22);
and vi) (22) also violates the natural rate hypothesis though once again the sum of inflation
coefficients on the right hand side is close to unity (it is also increasing in µ).
3. Optimal Monetary Policy in the Generalised Calvo-Taylor Model
We analyse optimal monetary policy both with commitment and under discretion in the
generalised Calvo-Taylor model of Section 1.  In particular we focus on the extent to which the
reduction in the coefficient on Et[Bt+1] below $, its value in the Calvo model, if q*>0 affects the
degree to which optimal policy commits to future lower inflation in order to influence the current
inflation-output tradeoff.  With a smaller coefficient on forward looking inflation in the Phillips
curve we show that the optimal use of this mechanism is reduced, an immediate consequence
being that optimal policy no longer implies price level targeting if q*>0.  Hence we demonstrate
that the value of q*, and thus the nature of the Phillips curve (14), has important implications for
optimal monetary policy.  As discussed in the introduction we make no claim that any particular
value of q* is correct, suggesting instead, in the spirit of the contributions to Taylor (1999), that
monetary policy recommendations should ideally be robust to different coefficients in the Phillips








Bt ’ c1,t%c2,t&1%c3,t&2%c4,t&3%... (24)
yt ’ d1,t%d2,t&1%d3,t&2%d4,t&3%... (25)
Commitment
We first derive the optimal timeless perspective monetary policy rule when commitment is
feasible by analysing the policy maker's minimisation of the (standard) loss function (23) subject
to the Phillips curve constraint (14).  In (23) 8 is the relative weight on output gap fluctuations
and for simplicity we assume that the target inflation rate is zero.  The latter assumption does not
affect the results except in so far as price level targeting would become targeting a price level
trend.  We also assume for simplicity that there is no serial correlation in the supply shocks and
that the policy maker may be thought of as setting output directly.
We proceed by first examining the constraints on policy imposed by the Phillips curve (14).  We
conjecture that inflation and output under the optimal rule will be linear in the current and past
values of the shock variable and given by (24) and (25) respectively where the coefficients c1, d1,
etc are to be determined.
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(27)
The structure of (26) repeats from ,t-2 across earlier shocks which imposes the constraint that
each value of the coefficients in (24) and (25) from c4 and d3 onwards respectively must differ
from the previous coefficient by a common multiplicative factor which we denote * such that
c4=*c3, c5=*c4, d3=*d2 etc.  Substituting this constraint into (26) gives (27) where the summary
parameter, A, is 1+$q*(q*+*).  The three square bracketed expressions to the right of each line
in (27) must all equal zero such that (27) as a whole equals zero given that the , terms may take
non-zero values.  Hence the Phillips curve (14) implies three separate constraints on the choice
of the coefficients in (24) and (25).  The latter may also be expressed by (28) and (29).  The
second and third lines of (27) also imply that as q* (and thus the kq* term of the second line)
tends to zero, c3 must tend to *c2 and d2 to *d1.22
Bt ’ c1,t%c2,t&1%c3(,t&2%*,t&3%*2,t&4%*3,t&5%...) (28)










Nt ’ e1,t%e2,t&1%e3(,t&2%*,t&3%*2,t&4%*3,t&5%...) (31)







Having analysed the constraint we derive optimal policy (the values of c1, c2, c3, d1, d2 and * by
maximising the Lagrangean (30) where Bt and yt are given by (28) and (29) and the summary
term, C, is simply the right hand side of (27).  The multiplier, Nt is conjectured to take the form
(31) such that it has three independent parameters to match the three constraints implicit in (27)
and a repeating structure comparable to Bt and yt.
We partially differentiate (30) with respect to c1, c2, c3, d1 and d2 and take the expectation of each
(using the assumption of uncorrelated shocks such that E[,i
2]=F
2 and E[,i,j]=0) to give the first
order conditions (32)-(36).     
15This expression may also be obtained from a simple perfect foresight optimisation of (30)
in B and y directly with no shocks after ,t-2.  If q*=0 (37) reduces to the equivalent expression
in Clarida et. al. (1999).  In the simulations below we assume values for k, ( and 8 such that (37)
has a solution with 0#*#1.  For some values of q* (37) has two solutions within this range in
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We substitute (32)-(36) into the three square bracketed expressions in (27), set each to zero and
solve the resulting simultaneous equations in e1, e2 and e3 subject to the constraint discussed
above that c3 tends to *c2 which implicitly determines * by (37).
15
The results for the coefficients in (31) are given by (38)-(40) where the summary parameters B
and D are given by (41)-(42).24
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D is expressed in compact form but may readily be shown to be positive such that B/D is positive
and thus e1, e4 and e5 are all negative.  If q*=0, e2=*e1 and e3=*
2e1 which, together with all the
results when q*=0, corresponds to the results of Clarida et. al. (1999) and McCallum and Nelson
(2000).
From (38)-(42) the coefficients of the reduced forms (28) and (29) and thus inflation and output
are straightforwardly derived from (32)-(36).  We first present an analytic result showing that the
cumulative effect on the price level of optimal policy following a shock is strictly positive if q*
is strictly positive which contrasts with the stationarity of the price level under an optimal rule
in the Calvo model where q*=0 shown by Clarida et. al. (1999).  To show this we assume a single
shock at some time s, *s, and note that from (28) the sum of the changes in inflation resulting
from this shock, which corresponds to the cumulative effect on the price level, is given simply
by (43).
Using the results above we may substitute for the c parameters in which case (43) may be shown
to equal (44) which is zero if q* is zero but strictly positive (negative) for an inflation increasing
(decreasing) shock if q* is strictly positive.25
We show the more general implications of the generalised Calvo-Taylor model derived above
for optimal policy graphically in Figures 2-4.  These show the response of inflation, output and
the price level under the optimal rule to a single shock (for illustrative purposes) in period 1.  The
simulations assume for illustration that there are no further shocks and that inflation and output
(and expectations of their future values) are all zero prior to the shock.  Assumed parameter
values are "=0.67, $=0.98, 0=6, 2=0.5, 8=0.5, q1=0.5-q*/2 and q=0.5+q*/2.  We do not specify
a value for the particular shock modelled but this has a simple multiplicative effect on all the
variables in all time periods and hence does not affect the comparisons between them.  For this
reason we do not show a numerical scale on the vertical axes.
Figure 2 shows the cumulative effect on the price level over time of the single shock in period
1 under the optimal rule for q*=0, 0.5, 1.  This confirms the result above that for q*>0 the
optimal rule does not correspond to targeting the price level whereas the price level is stationary
if q*=0.  It also shows that the long run impact of a shock on the price level is convex in q*.
Figure 3 shows inflation rates over time following the shock.  It may be seen that when q*>0
inflation the period after the shock tends to be positive.  This reflects two factors, first the shock
in period 1 also affects the Phillips curve in period 2 through the q*,t-1 term in (14), and second
the smaller coefficient on Et[Bt+1] in the Phillips curve with q*>0 implies less gain from the rule
committing to a low inflation rate the period after the shock.  The first of these factors matters
for the optimal inflation path but is not decisive for the long run price level remaining above its
initial value.  If we imposed this "shock" in period 2 in a Calvo model the price level would still
be stationary (since it is stationary in relation to a single shock and the effects of more than one
shock are additive).  In period 3 the effect of the Et[Bt+1] term may be seen in that the strongly26
negative inflation rates when q*>0 will improve the inflation-output tradeoff in period 2.  This
linkage between periods 2 and 3 is not affected by the reduced coefficient on forward looking
inflation in (14) because after period 1 the response to the period 1 shock is completely
predictable and the perfect foresight Phillips curve (15) has a coefficient on forward looking
inflation equal to $, as in the Calvo case, for any q*.  Figure 4 shows the output gap under the
optimal rule.  The time paths here are similar but the deviation of the output gap from zero is
larger the larger is q*.  This partly reflects the q*,t-1 term in (14) such that the total impact of the
period 1 shock is increasing in q*.
Discretion
Under discretion we continue to assume that the policy maker minimises the loss function (23)
subject to the Phillips Curve constraint (14) but with the additional constraint that commitment
is not possible.  This means that expectations already formed and past values of variables are
taken as given at the time that policy choices are made though the policy maker may and should
take into account the effect of current choices on future choices subject to that constraint.  In
effect the policy maker may take advantage of reduced form intertemporal relationships that
emerge from optimal policy making (which is important given the intertemporal nature of the
Phillips curve with q*>0) but cannot optimise those relationships directly.
To derive optimal policy under discretion we form the Lagrangean (44) where Tt is the multiplier



















Bt ’ DByt&1 % a1,t % a2,t&1 (46)
yt ’ Dyt&1 % b1,t % b2,t&1 (47)
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Given the presence of y t-1, ,t and ,t-1 in the Phillips curve we conjecture the reduced form
solutions for inflation and output given by (46) and (47) such that differentiating (45) with
respect to output will take account of the reduced form D parameters, including their effect on
expectations, but without the policy maker being able to optimise their values since this would
require a commitment to respond to past values.
From (45)-(47) we find the first order conditions for the maximisation of (45) shown by (48) and
(49).
Substituting the first order conditions into (14) we find that D is given by (50) and Tt by (51)
where coefficients and constants are shown by (52)-(54).28
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Having established the process for the multiplier we may substitute these results into the first
order conditions above to give inflation and output explicitly.  We show these results graphically
in Figure 5 below which compares rule and discretion outcomes for inflation and output for
q*=0, 0.5, 1.  The top pair of figures repeats the standard Calvo results (see Clarida et. al., 1999)
that optimal policy under discretion simply responds to the current value of the shock variable
with inflation and the output gap returning to zero immediately if no further shock occurs the
following period.  In this case D=0.  Once q* is greater than zero, y t-1 and ,t-1 appear in the
Phillips curve such that D is no longer zero (in fact it becomes negative) and policy both responds
to ,t-1 and also the current choice of output, yt, determines the value of "yt-1" the following period.
The latter effect is small, however, since in period 3 when the effect of the period 1 shock is no
longer present, optimal discretionary choices are close to zero.  Hence while the outcomes under
discretion are fairly close to the rule in period 1 when the shock occurs the major difference lies29
in period 3 when the rule can commit to negative inflation (which benefits the period 2 outcome
also) while discretion achieves only marginally negative inflation, in turn worsening the period
2 outcome.
Figures 6 and 7 give results for the effect of optimal policy in each case on the expected per
period value of the loss function.  As expected the loss under the rule is less than that under
discretion but both of them, and the relative gap between them shown by Figure 7, increase with
q*.  This follows from the fact that an increase in q* effectively raises the total variance of the
shocks hitting the economy since a shock in one period has an additional effect the following
period with weight q*.
Lastly, Figure 8 examines the reduced form persistence properties of inflation and output under
discretion, shown by the simple correlation coefficient between neighbouring values.  These are
zero when q*=0 (since the Calvo model has no intertemporal dimension under discretion) but rise
significantly above zero as q* increases.  It should be emphasised that we do not place a
structural interpretation on these values, especially that for inflation since Bt-1 is not present in
the Phillips curve (14), but they show that observed inflation and output persistence can arise
from the generalised Calvo-Taylor model without serial correlation in the shock process.
3. Conclusion
This paper has analysed the microfoundations of the New Keynesian Phillips Curve, exploring
the reason for the differences between the Calvo and Taylor models when prices are staggered.
It presented a generalised model which nested these as special cases by means of allowing the30
probability of firms changing price to vary between the period immediately after a price change
and subsequent periods.  While this change only affects one period, and is only one of many
possible changes to the staggering structures of these models that could be made, it shows that
the coefficients on expected inflation and the structure of the output and shock terms in the
Phillips curve vary significantly with the difference between these two probabilities.
The model clarifies the source of the different predictions for the Phillips curve in an otherwise
common framework, showing that they result solely from differences in staggering structures
given optimising behaviour by agents.  While not itself giving a unique prediction of the
appropriate Phillips curve coefficients to use in policy modelling the paper nevertheless has a
strong conclusion that we should be wary of policy results that rest sensitively on a particular
staggering assumption or, equivalently, a particular coefficient on forward looking inflation in
the Phillips curve.  In particular i) it was shown that the price level targeting result of Clarida,
Gali and Gertler (1999) is not robust to changes in the structure of staggering away from Calvo
pricing; and ii) that the generalised model may contribute to our understanding of observed
persistence in inflation (and output) even in the absence of a structural term in lagged inflation
in the Phillips Curve.31
Figure 1: Inflation Expectations Coefficients in the Generalised Calvo-Taylor Model
Simulation of (13) with $=0.98; "A-A" is the coefficient on Et[Bt+1], "B-B" is the coefficient on
Et-1[Bt], and their combined value is shown by "Sum".
Figure 2: Price Level Under the Optimal Rule (Single Shock in Period 1)32
Figure 3: Inflation Under the Optimal Rule (Single Shock in Period 1)
Figure 4: Output Gap Under the Optimal Rule (Single Shock in Period 1)33
Figure 5: Rule and Discretion Outcomes Compared (Single Shock in Period 1)34
Figure 6: Expected Level of Per Period Loss Under Rule and Discretion
Figure 7: Expected Relative Loss Under Rule and Discretion










Appendix A: Microfoundations of Optimal Price and Wage Setting
We derive expressions for the prices and wages that would be set each period in a flexible
price/wage environment in order to generate <ideal’ prices and wages per period which form part
of the derivation of optimal price (later wage) setting once staggering constraints are imposed.
The microfoundations of these choices are standard.  We consider a large number of symmetric,
monopolistically competitive firms, indexed by i, each with production function (A1), where Yi
is firm output, Ki the firm's capital stock which we hold constant and Li firm level employment.
Any multiplicative constant that may be present in (A1) is normalised to unity for convenience
and without loss of generality.  All expressions in this appendix refer to a single period and hence
for simplicity we do not include time subscripts.
Each firm also faces the demand curve (A2) where Pi is the firm's price, P the general price level
(defined as the weighted geometric mean of firm prices with weights summing to unity and equal
to the proportion of all firms with each particular price), 0 the common price elasticity of demand
(defined such that 0>0) and Ydi an index of aggregate demand per firm.
We also make use of the notation W for the common nominal wage which is exogenous to firms
individually, cK for the per period cost of capital (which plays no part in the analysis since capital
is fixed), and Ri for firm profits.  Profits are given by Ri=PiYi-WLi-cK in terms of the three
variables endogenous to the firm, Pi, Yi and Li.  For given Ydi and P the choice of any of these








































































Yi and Li to give profits in terms of Pi by (A3).
Differentiating (A3) with respect to Pi gives the first order condition for price, (A4), which may
be substituted into (1) and (2) to give optimal employment by (A5) and output by (A6).  The
second order condition for profit maximisation may readily be shown to be satisfied.
In (A4)-(A6) the powers on the firm level quantity variables, Li, Ki and Ydi are such that we may
multiply each of these by the number of firms which then cancels such that the Pi in (A4) may
be expressed as a function of aggregate demand, Yd, and the aggregate capital stock and (A5) and
(A6) give aggregate employment and output simply by dropping the i subscripts.  From this point
Ki may be normalised to unity.  Pi in (A4) may also be shown to be equal to nominal marginal



































We turn to wage setting behaviour, assuming that wages are set competitively by many small
groups of workers (who by symmetry set the same wage) whose preferences may be summarised
by the aggregate labour supply curve Ls=(W/P)
2 where without loss of generality a possible
multiplicative constant is normalised to unity.  Equating labour supply with aggregate labour
demand from (A5) without i subscripts gives the equilibrium real wage by (A7).  While we think
of workers setting the nominal wage we express outcomes in terms of the real wage for
convenience, noting that with contemporaneous wage setting rational workers will have full
information about the real wage that will result from any given nominal wage.  Using the labour
supply curve and (A1) equilibrium employment and output are given by (A8) and (A9).
Given that we have assumed complete within period price and wage flexibility and not yet
introduced shocks (A7)-(A9) may be interpreted as flexible wage-price natural rates.  Denoting
these with a "*" we may re-express (A4) and (A7), each with their right hand side variables at





















We make further use of (A11) when we consider staggering of wages below but for the time
being the core version of the model assumes complete wage flexibility while prices are staggered
so (A11) may simply be substituted into (A10) which gives (A12) as the ideal single period price
which would be set by an individual firm in the absence of staggering constraints.
As a final step (see Walsh, 1998 p.219) we take logs of (A12) and assume a log linear shock to
price setting (which could also arise from wage setting through (A11) substituted into (A10)),
,, to give (A13) as the single period ideal price in logs which we denote p* (without an i
subscript since it is symmetric across all firms).  We also add time subscripts and y refers to the
log of (Y/Y*), the output gap.39
pt&1 ’ sxt&1 % (1&s)E
4
r’2Trxt&r (B1)
Appendix B: Inflation Given Optimal Prices or Wages
We first derive the aggregate inflation rate for given individual staggered prices set by firms for
use in the derivation of the generalised Calvo-Taylor Phillips curve in Section 1.  The new price
set by firms in period t that are able to change their price at that time is xt, and the probability of
being able to change price again the following period is q1 and, assuming that a new price has not
already been set, q each period thereafter.  We derive the distribution of prices existing in each
period, distinguished by the time since they were set, on the assumption that the distribution is
in its ergodic stationary state.  Given that distribution the derivation of the inflation rate in terms
of prices set at different times is straightforward.
We start by assuming that at time t-1 there is a given (for the time being unknown) proportion
of firms, s, that have changed their price at t-1 with the remaining prices having been set at time
t-r being distributed with (unknown) weights (1-s)Tr such that pt-1 is given by (B1) where 3T=1.
Moving forward one period to time t, these prices will evolve as follows.  Considering the first
term in (B1), the probability of these prices changing again at time t is q1 and the probability of
remaining the same, 1-q1.  Given the assumed large number of firms these probabilities translate
into proportions and hence at time t these prices will become xt with weight (ie. their proportion
of all the prices that will exist at time t) q1s and remain at xt-1 with weight (1-q1)s.  Of the prices
in the second term in (B1), the probability of their changing is q and hence these prices will either
change into xt (with weight (1-s)q, noting that 3T=1) or remain at xt-r (with weights (1-q)(1-s)Tr
respectively).  Hence pt is given by (B2).40
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Making use of the notation q-q1=q* we first equate the proportions of newly changed prices at
t-1, s in (B1), and t, q1s+(1-s)q in (B2), which implies that s=q/(1+q*).  Substituting for s in (B1)
and (B2) gives (B3) and (B4) for pt-1 and pt.
Equating the proportions of prices set 1, 2, 3 etc. periods before in (B3) and (B4) gives T1=q and
Tr=q(1-q)
r-2 for r$2.  Substituting these T values into (B4) gives (B5) and subtracting the
equivalent expression for pt-1 gives inflation, Bt by (B6).
In Section 1 (B6) is re-expressed in a convenient form and we also make use of (B7) which is
derived from shifting (B6) one period forward and take expectations at t.41
pt ’ wt % (1&")
"
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Appendix C: Staggered wages with flexible prices
We turn to the rate of inflation in the generalised Calvo-Taylor model of Section 2 where wages
are staggered and prices are set flexibly period by period ex post.  Workers are assumed to face
the same probabilities over the ability to change their wages as firms did over their prices in the
price setting version of the model set out in Section 1.  Since the resulting structure of this
version of the model is very similar we give a brief treatment.  Firstly, from (A10) with Pi=P
(given that all price setting is at the same time ex post) the log price is given by (C1).
From (C1) the rate of price inflation, B, in terms of nominal wage inflation B
w is given by (C2).
From (A11) the ideal wage that workers would set each period in the absence of any constraints
on changing wages again, w*, is given by (C3) where (
w is shown by (C4).
We assume that workers' utility maximisation problem may be approximated by the minimisation
of a loss function quadratic in the actual wage relative to the ideal wage given by (C3), the
equivalent assumption to that for price setting.  Given this the optimisation problem has the same
form as (3) except with x



























period, and w* in place of x and p*.  Following this the first order condition (4) follows directly,
as do (5)-(8) and the expressions in Appendix B with w and B
w in place of p and B.  Substituting
from the wage setting version of (B7) and w* from (C3) into the wage setting version of (8) gives
x
w for t and t-1 by expressions with the same structure as (9) and (11) except with the change in
notation outlined above and the coefficient (
w+(1-")/" in place of (.  Substitution of these into
(12) for B
w gives (13) with the same changes as above.  Use of (C2) then gives price inflation in
the staggered wages version of the model by (C5) where the first two lines equal wage inflation
and the last two lines the difference between price inflation and wage inflation.  The coefficients
on the output gap and shock terms in (C5) may be expressed more compactly but our focus is on
showing that the coefficients on expected inflation in this staggered wages version of the model
are the same as the staggered prices version (13).43
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